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In a fairly recent case 7 the facts were very analogous to those of
the principal case, with the exception that no option was involved.
There an agency relationship was created orally between the
parties that the agent was to purchase a certain building for his
principal, but the agent ultimately bought the property for himself
with his own money. It was held that a constructive trust arose in
favor of the principal based upon such fiduciary breach. There
was the added element, it appears, that the parties were old friends
and had aided each other in other financial matters (a type of
confidential relation), but no particular point was made of this fact.
It would thus appear the modern tendency is towards holding
the agent as trustee of any real property which he buys for himself
when such purchase is in violation of the agent's fiduciary duty,
even though the agency is created by oral agreement. The distinc-
tion leading to avoidance of the Statute of Frauds is a fine one, but




T HIS comment considers express trusts which fail because of
illegality. Not included in the discussion are trusts which fail
or are unenforceable for noncompliance with formal statutory
requisites. A trust may fail because of illegality for any one of
several reasons: where performance requires criminal or tortious
acts on the part of the trustee, where enforcement will be contrary
to public policy, where the trust is motivated by a fraudulent pur-
pose, or where consideration for the trust is illegal.
Perhaps the most important and recurring of these is the trust
created for a fraudulent purpose. Thus, a trust may be illegal be-
cause of the motive of the settlor in creating it, even though its
21 Kuzlik v. Swasney. 383 IM. 354. 49 N. E. (2d) 212 (1943).
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provisions are otherwise lawful. The most usual illustration of
this principle is the case where the owner of property transfers it
to another upon trust for himself for the purpose of defrauding
creditors. The rule is universal that the defrauded person can
reach the property.' However, as between the parties, the convey-
ance is valid, and the settlor usually cannot recover the trust
corpus.2 The recent case of Gore v. Gore' exemplifies the attitude
of the courts. It was there said:
"It is elementary that property conveyed to a trustee with the view
of defrauding creditors or other persons, the conveyances actually hav-
ing effect, is not recoverable by the grantor or his heirs or personal
representatives. In such case, no trust results to the grantor, and equity
will leave the parties to such transaction in the position in which they
have placed themselves, refusing all aflrmative aid to either of the
fraudulent participants."'4
The majority of courts limit this doctrine to cases where there
actually were creditors who may have been injured by the convey-
ance. Thus, they enforce the trust where the property conveyed is
exempt, or where in reality there were no creditors, regardless of
the fraudulent intent of the grantor.5 Adherence to this view in
Texas was early laid down in the case of Rivera v. White.6 In this
case a husband, fearing that alimony would be decreed against
him in a divorce suit, conveyed property to his sister on agree-
ment that she would reconvey later. It was determined that the
grantor's wife did not have a valid claim for alimony, and the
ILa Force v. Brackin, 163 S. W. (2d) 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) affirmed 169 S. W.(2d) 465; Sullivan v. Fant, 110 S. W. 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) writ of error refused;
R .TATrMENT, TRUSTS § 63 (1935) ; and 42 T.. Jim., Trusts, § 63 (1936).
2 Biccochi v. Casey-Swasey Co., 91 Tex. 259, 42 S. W. 963 (1897) ; Elliott v. Elliott,
120 S. W. (2d) 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) writ of error dism'd.; O'Laughlin v. Moran,
250 S. W. 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) writ of error dism'd.; and Scarbrough v. Blount,
154 S. W. 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
3 203 S. W. (2d) 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
4 Id. at 263.
5 Harmon v. Schmitz, 113 Tex. 198. 39 S. W. (2d) 587 (1931); Wells v. Jamison,
252 S. W. 1023 (Tex. Com. App. 1923); RESTATEMENT, TaUSTS § 63 (1935); 3 Scorr
ON TRUSTS § 422 (1939) ; and 42 Tm. Jua., Trusts 1 63 (1936).
6 94 Tex. 538. 63 S. W. 125 (1901).
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property was ordered reconveyed to the husband by the court. In
rejecting the argument that the grantor's fraudulent intent pre-
cluded recovery, the Court declared: ". . . no policy of the law is
thwarted by a mere motive which cannot work injury to creditors."'
A few jurisdictions proceed on the "clean hands" doctrine, and
refuse to enforce such a trust; this, as has been suggested,' is per.
haps the more logical view, if the policy is to suppress fraudulent
conveyances. Nevertheless, the majority rule is deeply entrenched
and consistently followed.9
The public policy supporting the rule of the Gore case would
also render unenforceable a trust where, instead of conveying
property which he already owns, a person purchases property in
the name of another for the purpose of defrauding creditors or
other claimants. This appears to be true whether an express trust
or resulting trust is claimed. 0
Similarly, the general rule condemns a trust where the pur-
pose is to clothe the transferee with apparent ownership in order
that he may defraud others. However, some Texas cases hardly
seem consistent with this doctrine. For example, in Citizens Nat.
Bank v. Sturgis Nat. Bank1 a wife transferred bank stock to her
husband to enable him to qualify as a director in the bank. The
understanding was that he would reconvey as soon as he was
elected a director. The husband reconveyed to the wife, and a
creditor of the husband sought to garnish the stock. The judgment
was that the husband held in trust for his wife, even though the
transaction was an evasion of the Federal banking laws, and the
creditor was denied relief. Another case has held that a conveyance
by a mother to her son for the purpose of enabling him to secure
a loan, be to reconvey after the loan was repaid, created a valid
7 Id. at 541, 63 S. W. 125, 126.
8 Note, 5 Tx.. L. REv. 101 (1927).
9 See note 5, supra.
10 RESTATrME T, TRUSTS § 63 (1935): and 1 Sco oN TRUSTS § 63 (1939).
1181 S. W. 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) writ of error refused.
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trust which the mother could enforce. 2 While these cases do not
definitely repudiate the general rule, it is thought that the current
trend is toward an opposite result.'8
A trust may fail because its performance involves the commis-
sion of criminal or tortious acts by the trustee. This is true where
the trust is to carry on an illegal business or where the trust is
in restraint of trade. Thus, a provision that the trustee should carry
on the business of manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquor
is invalid where it would be illegal to carry on the business;"
similarly, a trust to engage in the illegal practice of medicine is
invalid.'6
However, where a trust provides that the trustee shall do an
act which is legal at the time of the creation of the trust, and sub-
sequently a change in law or circumstances renders it illegal, the
provision becomes unenforceable and nugatory.' 6 The effect of
such a provision on other provisions of the trust instrument is
considered infra.
It should be here noted that if a trust is created for purposes
which are not illegal, the fact that the trust property was acquired
by the grantor in an illegal transaction does not, of itself, invali-
date the trust. In the case of Smith v. Barnes the plaintiff, who
had made a profit through the illegal sale of liquor, used the
money so acquired in purchasing securities in the name of the
defendant. The court decreed that the defendant held the securi-
ties on a resulting trust for the plaintiff, and that the trust was
enforceable in spite of the illegality of the means by which the
plaintiff had made the profit."8 However, if the settlor was under
a duty to restore the property, the true owner can reach the prop-
12 Watts v. Wofford. 239 S. W. 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) writ of error retused.
13 RSTATEmENT, TRusTs § 63, comment c. (1935).
14 Stout v. Stout. 192 Ky. 504. 233 S. W. 1057 (1921).
15 Joe Gouy Shong v. Joe Chew Shee, 254 Mass. 36. 150 N. E. 225 (1926).
16 RSTATEMLNT, TnusTs § 61, comment b. (1935).
17 129 Ore. 138. 276 Pac. 1086 (1929).
18 42 Tml. Jun., Trusts, § 62 (1936).
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erty in the hands of the trustee, provided that no bona fide pur-
chaser intervenes.
A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust, may fail for ille-
gality because the enforcement of the trust or the provision is
against public policy, for example, where the enforcement of the
trust tends to induce the commission of illegal or immoral acts.
Thus, where the benefits of a trust are conditioned upon the secur-
ing of a divorce or upon a separation or refusal to support one's
wife, the condition is invalid.' 9 Similarly, a disposition of prop-
erty may be illegal on the ground of its tendency to restrain mar-
riage.2" But a disposition, the object of which is to provide for a
person so long as that person remains unmarried, is not illegal al-
though it may offer something of an inducement to remain single.21
A trust created in violation of some statutory prohibition will
not be enforced. In Zundell v. Gess22 it was held that where an
alien buys property, taking title in the name of a citizen to evade
the statute relating to alien ownership, no resulting trust arose in
his favor.
It has been determined that a disposition is illegal if it tends
to restrain performance of public duties. A condition divesting
the interest of a devisee if he should enter into the military service
of his country has been held to be against public policy. 3 A for-
tiori, such a condition would be invalid where a statute provides
for compulsory military service.
A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust may be invalid as
being within the inhibition of the Rule against Perpetuities, that is,
where an interest is created which will not vest within twenty-one
years after some life in being at the time of the creation of the
19 Potter v. M'Alpine, 3 Dem. 108, 124 (N. Y. 1885); RESTATEME.NT, TausTs, § 62
(1935); and 65 C. J., Trusts, § 95 (1933).
20 Matter of Liberman, 279 N. Y. 458, 18 N. E. (2d) 658 (1939); and 65 C. I.,
Trusts § 95 (1933).
21 Irwin v. Irwin, 179 App. Div. 871, 167 N. Y. Supp. 76 (1917); and RESTATEMENT,
TrUSTS, § 62, comment g. (1935).
22 73 Tex. 144, 10 S. W. 693 (1899).
23 In re Beard. I Ch. 383 (1908).
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trust. Thus, any contingent beneficial interest which may vest be-
yond the period of the rule is invalid." Implicit in the rule against
perpetuities is the public policy against restraints on alienation.
Direct restraints on the trustee have been sustained, but only to
serve the purpose of proper trust administration; in Dulin v.
Moore"5 a provision that the trustee should not alienate the prop-
erty except for purposes of reinvestment was held valid.
A provision in the terms of the trust relating to the administra-
tion of the trust is unenforceable if to enforce it would prevent
proper administration of the trust. For example, a provision re-
lieving the trustee of all liability to account for the administration
is opposed to public policy. Similarly, a provision which would
prevent the court from removing a trustee where such removal is
necessary for proper administration of the trust is invalid."'
While ordinarily trusts are created gratuitously, considera-
tion is sometimes given for the creation of a trust. And where
consideration passes, the trust may be illegal because of illegality
of consideration. On this ground trusts created in consideration of
unlawful cohabitation, or of the compounding of a felony, have
been held to fail."1
A trust may provide that upon the happening of a certain
event, the interest of a beneficiary shall be divested, and that his
interest shall vest in another. Where the condition is for any reason
illegal, the courts usually hold that the interest to which the condi-
tion is attached is absolute; the interest survives whether or not the
condition is performed. Such a provision-terminating an interest
already vested-is a condition subsequent. A more difficult prob-
lem is posed in the case of a condition precedent where the event
must happen before the beneficiary is vested with the interest. The
24 Brooker v. Brooker, 130 Tex. 27. 106 S. W. (2d) 247 (1937) ; Clarke v. Clarke,
121 Tex. 165. 46 S. W. (2d) 658 (1932); and Anderson v. Menefee, 174 S. W. 904
(Tex. Civ. App. 1915) writ of error refused.
21 17 Tex. 135. 70 S. W. 742 (1902).
20 1 Scorr oYg TRUSTS § 62.15 (1939).
2? Taylor v. Ashe. 284 Masn. 182. 187 N. E. 548 (1933).
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leading case of Matter of Liberman's is illustrative of decisions
in this regard. There, the testator devised property in portions in
trust, one son to share should he marry with the consent of his
brother and sister; otherwise, the income and principal of that
portion of the trust were to go to the brother and sister. It ap-
peared that the dominant purpose was to induce the son to marry
within his faith, which would have been valid as a reasonable
restraint on marriage. The terms of the will, however, did not
limit the condition but required that his marriage be with consent
of the very persons who would profit by withholding their consent.
The court reasoned that the tendency of this provision might be
to induce the beneficiary to live in celibacy or adultery, and
adjudged the condition void. Regarding the effect of the invalidity
of the condition, the court said:
"... [T] o declare the condition void without at the same time giving
effect to the gift made upon the void condition, would be a mockery of
the beneficiary and by indirection would permit a testator to accom-
plish a result which we hold to be contrary to the 'common weal'."2:
Where illegality appears in a trust instrument, there is always the
problem as to how far-reaching its effects will be. In many of the
situations discussed here, the whole trust fails. However, if the
purposes for which the trust is created are legal, the mere fact
that the settlor directs a method of administration which is illegal
does not invalidate the trust if the desired result may be obtained
through other methods which are not illegal. Frequently only a pro-
vision or term of a trust is invalid; whether the entire trust will
fail depends upon whether such provision may be separated from
the remainder without defeating the purpose of the settlor in creat-
ing the trust. In Clarke v. Clarke,0 a remainder was void as in
violation of the Rule against Perpetuities. The Court held that the
trust was valid and the beneficiaries took the estate in fee, and
23 279 N. Y. 458. 18 N. E. (2d) 658 (1939).
29 279 N. Y. 458, .. 18 N. E. (2d) 658. 662 (1939).
30 121 Tex. 165. 46 S. W. (2d) 658 (1932).
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